“Thinking About China Thinking About Us”

IT’s been clear from reported conversations with Chinese diplomats that Beijing finds many U.S. perceptions of what China’s been up to since the end of the Cold War, “dead wrong.” Also, these officials have led some U.S. counterparts to believe that Beijing obtains comfort from the West believing in “a mysterious Orient,” as if China learned that it could keep the West guessing, never knowing the true China.

            But much of how the U.S. thinks about China has been the result of Beijing lacking the transparency that could reveal which of its possible intentions will be chosen for fruition.

            Which color will the chameleon (Beijing) choose in the next instant, and in which direction will it move? Using baseball parlance, which will be hurled next from Beijing, a curveball, fastball or a slider? Will it be inside or wide when cornering the plate?

Because of insufficient knowledge about China’s global intentions, U.S. analysts have wondered if Beijing decided several years back to grow its economic, military and political influence around the world to (a) become the world’s one and only superpower, or  (b) only raise China’s standard of living, without serious concern about maintaining global or regional superpower status; or (c) have what it takes for just enough control of needed resources like petroleum, so that China could sustain its manufacturing and services for its exports and therefore prevent the Chinese economy from slipping way back into the poverty that existed for the Chinese people several decades ago; or, China may have decided that it would be necessary to (d) keep other powers from interfering with its ability to sustain the rapid growth rates that it has achieved, “no hegemony in mind except as last resort means.”

Could it then be that China’s recent military build-up is nothing more than the expression of a country that has planned to match military strength proportionately with its economic growth, to have the capability to protect, if necessary, the economic and political influence that it has built up since the 1990’s?

Some analysts claim that Beijing has considered actualization of all of the above, that it has maneuvered to satisfy each of the above-cited objectives depending on world situational factors.

Other analysts add that Beijing thinks about using military power “as leverage” for achieving special but limited ends, for example, to attack Taiwan, or lending show-of-force support to Iran during the latter’s disputes with the West.

            Fact: Neither the U.S. nor any other Western nation knows China’s intentions with great certainty. Even so, American politics continues to weigh in on the possibilities, e.g., America's conservatives being sure that China wants to dominate the West and will do whatever it takes to have that happen, to include the use of military force.

Meanwhile, American liberals think otherwise, that China will never be imperialist, though Beijing may rattle its cage before other nations from time to time. Many liberals believe that China behaves as would any country experiencing new growth, wanting a bigger slice of the global economic pie, Beijing without any interest in land-grabbing or in besting the U.S. only to be numero uno, or because it fears the U.S.

            So, which way will China be going in the near and distant future? Will it work to have the ways and means to engage whatever the winds blowing from the West conjure up? This requires Beijing to have the ability to counter that which appears to its leaders to be unlawful aggression, though such may not be the case. The always possible scenario is Beijing or Washington misinterpreting sudden out-of-the-box behavior, using military power to preempt what it may be thinking is preparation for aggression.

            More than likely, and since neither the U.S. nor China sees the other except through that proverbial glass darkly, each will keep several hard and soft options at the ready, and at the starting gate.

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